In mid-July a popular English-language weekly that covers economics, politics and finance published an article discussing the spread of Islamist terror groups in the Sahel, and the “fall” of Nigeria. Perhaps you read it …
Like a lot of mainstream media the article provided an adequate overview, but tended toward the alarmist. They didn’t mention perhaps the most adept group in the region, the Al Qaeda (AQ) affiliated Al Murabitoun, led by Mokhtar Belmokhtar (who has been claimed to have been killed in drone strikes and the like at least four times, only to reappear and lead attacks deep into several West African states). They didn’t mention that circa 2016 the Nigerians partnered with Cameroon and Chad to almost rout Boko Haram (BH) in the tri-border area. They talked of the need for airstrikes as if the Nigerians hadn’t already been conducting them. They overly focused on the IS-flavour-of-the-day at the expense of covering the still-very-potent-AQ. Worse, there was suggestion that Nigeria could somehow “fall” despite the fact that in reality the conflict with BH and the IS-linked splinter remains largely confined to Borno and immediately neighbouring states (more below re demographic resistance to spread). Such alarmism and cherry-picking of factors and actors is of little use to those with vested interests in the region, and runs the risk of leading them to incorrect conclusions.
The authors intimated the possibility of coordination between AQ-affiliated and IS-affiliated organisations – this is pretty uncommon. Just because they’re both Islamist terrorist groups doesn’t mean they’re allies. Although the former spawned the latter they now compete, can fight between themselves, and have different ideologies and modus operandi. The real worry is that the existence of two such opposing organisations in one geography tends to lead to an increase in violence and the tempo of attacks – they compete for credibility, publicity, money, recruits and so on.
The most valuable part of the article was an interview with the senior US military officer responsible for the region. His words were far more measured and not “histrionic” (his word), compared to the bulk of this somewhat misleading article. His statements referred to worries over a) “youth bulges” (i.e. demographic change where there are large amounts of young adults, often without employment, and within whom resentment can build and lead to radicalisation – or merely generate openness to the offer of money from whomever, regardless of tilt), b) AQ and its ability to adopt and re-purpose existing conflicts related to ethnicity, climate change, desertification, resource pressures, population growth, lack of development and employment, and perhaps most importantly c) the political will of war-weary-Western and cash-strapped-African nations to deal with this effectively now, whilst the conflict might still be contained. So, yes, the Sahel is certainly a worry; there are significant challenges to be overcome, and it will take much time, blood, and treasure to overcome them - but we shouldn’t take this to mean that Nigeria, Africa’s biggest economy, is in imminent peril.
Should you be concerned about the effects of this on Nigeria and Nigerian investments? We don’t believe so, and probably not for quite a while/ not before some very significant developments. The geographic distances between the conflict and the core areas where most overseas investment lands, are significant, and importantly those areas are centred within the predominantly Christian population of the Southern half of Nigeria. Organisations like BH, IS, and AQ require a host population to live within, disguise their movements within, and draw support from, and so the South constitutes a physically hostile environment for them to reach into. This was evidenced by IS’ inability to penetrate into the largely Shia areas of Southern Iraq. Within Nigeria the conflict with BH and the IS splinter is likely to be contained within Borno and its three immediately neighbouring states, and even if it spreads further is unlikely to be able to penetrate South to any significant degree and beyond the odd short-lived raid. Far more fertile ground for these groups can be found to the North and East, rather than South. Of more immediate concern in Nigeria will be the ongoing Fulani conflict and its impacts on fragile Nigerian politics in the run-up to the general elections on 16th February 2019, on Federal budgets for military activity, and on the government’s ability to focus on the economy.