President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi has his hands full. Whilst Egypt’s fighting with Islamic State-allied (IS or Daesh) militants centred around Arish in Northern Sinai has caught the world’s eye and has been robustly addressed with much publicity by the Egyptian military, there also exists a bubbling conflict in the Western Desert that is worth monitoring. Despite billions of dollars of US support and investment in monitoring and guarding of the 700-mile-long Libyan border it remains porous, and both IS-linked militants and Al Qaeda-affiliated (AQ) groups such as Ansar al-Islam feature there.
As has been seen elsewhere in Africa and the Middle East when IS- and AQ-linked groups operate in the same territory they compete and this rivalry often leads to an uptick in violence. IS and AQ differ in their modus operandi, with the former generally favouring more brutal actions and seeking to directly confront local security forces in an effort to physically secure territory, and the latter preferring more technologically adept, and high impact strikes. Each has therefore attracted a different character of militant, and amongst analyst circles there has been some consensus that AQ has been quietly gathering strength whilst the world’s attention has been focussed on the destruction of IS – the Council on Foreign Relations believes there are 6,000 AQ-linked fighters in Egypt and Libya alone.
In common with AQ’s general style Ansar al-Islam has developed a reputation for conducting infrequent but high-impact attacks on security forces – directly contrasting the all-out engagement tactics of the IS-allied militants in Sinai. This perhaps bears out the allegation by some analysts that Ansar al-Islam’s ranks are populated with former Egyptian soldiers and special forces operatives, who feel disenfranchised by the lack of true political change in Egypt that seemed promised by the 2011 Arab Spring, and the short-lived rise of the Muslim Brotherhood. This would seem to validate the sentiment that the regime’s heavy-handed tactics against dissent are fostering wider radicalisation and driving recruits into the arms of both AQ- and IS- affiliated groups, where before such individuals might have found outlet via the MB.
If that wasn’t enough, he’s also faced with a population boom that the head of Egypt’s statistical agency, Abu Bakr el-Gendy, called a “catstrophe”. President Sisi subsequently described it as “a challenge as critical as that of terrorism.” Egypt’s population reached 104.27 million in 2017 according to a census - increasing 18% in the last 8 years. The population increases annually by 2.5m and such growth requires the provision of 2,500 new schools and 50 hospitals each year plus other expensive infrastructure projects including power supplies, potable water and affordable housing. The average age in Egypt is now 24.8 years, meaning more than 60% of the population are under 20. Egypt’s unemployment rate is now at approximately 12% but this number will inevitably rise as the numbers attempting to enter the work force increase. Educated but underemployed youth have the potential to be radicalised either by political or terrorist organisations - a vicious cycle that could lead to more terrorism and further negative impacts on economic growth.
To counter this, in June the Ministry of Social Solidarity announced the launch of a ‘Two are Enough’ family planning campaign. The campaign will target mainly rural areas and aims to cut birth rates to 2.4 per woman nationally (currently the rate is 3.31). Many Egyptians are resistant to birth control targets though, and believe it to be anti-Islam. Others still view large families as a safe guard for old age or illness, and a source of some economic stability.
In August Egypt’s Ministry of Health announced another new strategy aimed at controlling the rapidly growing population by raising awareness of birth control methods. However, the Ministry of Health has so far failed to address a hit or miss supply of certain medications including birth control pills, plus the increasing prices of such products. Drug shortages have been an issue in Egypt over recent years. Scarcities first became noticeable in early 2016 when US Dollars were in short supply. At that time, in response, the Health Ministry increased the price of drugs that cost EGP 30 or less by up to 20%. The crisis continued after the flotation of the Egyptian Pound with a decision being announced by the Ministry to further increase the prices of approximately 3,000 drugs which included increasing prices by 30 to 50% on 10% of local medicines and on 15% of imported ones. The floatation of the EGP financially impacted many industries relying on imported goods and products and the pharmaceutical industry was no exception. Egypt today continues to suffer a critical shortage of expensive imported medications, and locally produced drugs are also in short supply due to the high import costs of raw materials. To further complicate the Ministry’s mission, currently, the Egypt’s minimum wage currently stands at EGP 1,200.00 (US$ 67). A 21-day supply of Yasmin Contraceptive Pills retails at EGP 58.50. A pack of 3 Durex condoms retails at EGP 45.00. Both prices are out of reach for the majority of Egyptians who live on less than US$ 2 per day.
If President Abdel Fattah el-Sisi fails to implement sufficient economic reform and create jobs, if the state fails to slow population growth, and if the subsidy reductions demanded by the IMF bite too hard (esp contentious will be the IMF’s demand to cut the bread subsidy), then the heavily populated Nile Valley could prove fertile ground for radicalisation.